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Abstract This paper develops a novel formal semantics of ideophones that can
account for their meaning and compositional properties. The proposal extends
recent work on iconicity in sign languages in Davidson 2015, whose demonstration-
based framework provides a formal foundation for the semantics of ideophones
that captures the difference between descriptive meaning and depictive meaning,
the kind of meaning ideophones traffic in. After providing a demonstration-based
account of the basic ideophone construction in the Mayan language Tseltal, the
paper then shows how the demonstration-based account can be used to analyze
pluractionality in the ideophone domain. In particular, through case studies on
Tseltal and Upper Necaxa Totonanc (Totonacan), I show that there are two previously
unrecognized types of ideophonic pluractionality, and that their properties support
the demonstration-based account.
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1 Introduction
The term ideophone is used to pick out a distinguished class of words in a language
that specialize in depicting sensory imagery (Dingemanse 2011: p. 25; 2012). While
the expressions considered in this work fit the definition, ideophones are often easier
to point at than define. For this reason, consider the following example of the
ideophone tsok’ in Tseltal (Mayan).
(1) pura
just
ch’il-bil-Ø,
fried-PERF-B3
tsok’
IDF:sound.start.to.fry
x-chi-Ø
NT-say-B3
ta
P
mantekat
lard
‘it just gets fried, it goes « tsok’» in the lard’(Pérez González 2012: p. 162)
The literature on the formal semantics of ideophones is scarce. This is, I think,
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due to two challenges: (i) it is not at all clear how to formalize the distinction
between descriptive meaning, which is at the heart of truth-conditional semantics, and
depictive meaning, which ideophones seem to traffic in, and (ii) the idiosyncractic
specificity of ideophone meaning and their restricted (morpho)syntactic distribution
presents obstacles for doing formal lexical semantics. In particular, by avoiding
modification and appearing as arguments to only a small class of verbs, it is difficult
to isolate their meaning and to determine their type. The goal of this paper is to
address both of these problems, and in doing so, begin to develop a formal semantics
of ideophones that can account for their meaning and compositional properties.
To address the first problem, I propose an analysis of ideophones that extends
recent work in Davidson 2015, which provides a novel unified account of quotation
and a variety of iconic phenomena in sign language in terms of a demonstrations—a
special type of communicative event that stands in a similarity relation with the event
demonstrated. The demonstration-based framework will provide a formal foundation
for the semantics of ideophones that can capture the difference between description
and depiction. Addressing the second problem is more complex because it means
exploring the range of ideophone meaning and making comparisons to the meanings
of expressions from more well-known categories. While pluractional meaning is
often idiosyncratic, many ideophones clearly have pluractional semantics (i.e., they
make reference to plural events). Since the typology of pluractional meaning is
fairly well understood (Hofherr & Laca 2012; Wood 2007, among many others), it
provides exactly the hook into problem that we need. We can group ideophones by
the variety of pluractionality they exhibit, and then provide templates that generalize
over particular items to capture this aspect of ideophone meaning.
Along these lines, this paper shows through case studies on two Mesoameri-
can languages, Tseltal (Mayan) and Upper Necaxa Totonac (Totonacan), that there
are two broad types of ideophonic pluractionality and that their form supports the
demonstration-based analysis. The first, which I call “demonstration-external plurac-
tionality”, involves a speaker using an ideophone to do a plurality of demonstrations
that characterize a plurality of events. The second kind of ideophonic pluractionality,
which I call a “demonstration-internal pluractionality”, is much more similar to
pluractionality in the verbal domain. It involves morphology that derives ideophones
that can only be used to demonstrate plural events.
2 Demonstration-based theory of quotation
When thinking about quotation, we usually think about verbatim quotation, where
the act of quotation concerns the words used. For instance, suppose Mary says (2).
(2) I play guitar.
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Mary can then be quoted as in (3), where words alone ensure the quotation is true.
(3) Mary was like “I play guitar”.
While this is maybe the most salient situation, it is well known that be like-quotation
can be felicitously used to replicate a variety of aspects of an event (Clark & Gerrig
1990; Davidson 2015, among others). For instance, words can be used to “quote” an
agent’s behavior or inner monologue, even if those particular words are not used,
as shown in (4) where the the quotative sentence is judged true even though the cat
never uttered the quoted words.
(4) My cat meows loudly and paces around its food bowl.
a. My cat was like “feed me!” (Davidson 2015: ex. 21)
Davidson’s 2015 proposal, following earlier work by Clark & Gerrig (1990), is to
say that verbatim quotation is merely a special case of what we see in (4). The theory
that unites them says that all quotation involves the performance or demonstration
of an event. One can demonstrate or perform an event by performing the words that
occur in it—i.e., verbatim quotation—but one can also perform all sorts of aspects of
the event, including intonations, facial expressions, thoughts, etc. The downside to
this kind of theory is that, as we will see, we have to radically underspecify the truth
conditions for quotative sentences. But, this might just be a bullet we have to bite.
The core idea in Davidson 2015 is that there is a distinguished subset of events,
namely a class of events with communicative intent she calls demonstrations.1
Davidson (2015) gives demonstrations their own type δ , and while not formalized,
the intended interpretation is that δ is a subtype of ε—the type of events.2 To
implement this, the backdrop for the account is lax many-sorted type logic. Lax just
means that (i) we do not require domains for sorts to be disjoint, and (ii) equality
(and only equality) is type agnostic—e.g., σ = σ ′ is a formula even if σ and σ ′ are
terms with different types. Below are the highlights of the setup that are necessary
for understanding the analysis.
The domain of individuals of type e is the powerset of a designated set of entities
IN minus the empty set: De =℘+(IN) =℘(IN) \ /0. In addition to the domain of
individuals, I additionally assume, following Hinrichs 1985; Bach 1986; Link 1998,
1 Note that while this section is heavily based on Davidson’s work, I have altered some things and
made assumptions about the domains of events, demonstrations, and linguistic expressions that she
might not agree with. When it’s clear that I have diverged from her work, I note it in the text.
2 This could be implemented in some variety of lambda calculus with subtyping, like F< (see Retoré
2014) or TCL (see Asher 2011). I do not take this route because I do not need all the power these
systems provide, and the resulting models become fairly complicated. I will instead work with a more
familiar many-sorted type logic. The trade off, of course, is that I will need additional quantifiers,
relations, etc. over new types, but I believe that the result is manageable.
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structured domains of events and times. The domain of events of type ε is the
powerset of a designated set of events EV minus the empty set: Dε =℘+(EV) =
℘(EV) \ /0. The domain of times of type τ is the powerset of a designated set of
times TM minus the empty set, and is additionally partially ordered by ≺ (temporal
precedence): Dτ =℘+(TM) =℘(TM)\ /0. Finally, following Davidson 2015, we
add the novel domain of demonstrations of type δ , which is powerset of a designated
set DM ⊂ EV minus the empty set: Dδ =℘+(DM) =℘(DM) \ /0. Note that the
domain of demonstrations is a subset of the domain of events. I want to think of
demonstrations as events of communication under a particular guise that allows
certain constructions, like be like-quotatives or ideophone constructions, to extract
their communicative intent.
Atomic individuals and atomic events are the singleton sets in℘+(IN),℘+(EV),
℘+(DM) respectively; they are identified by a predicate ATOM (which I’ll apply
to individuals, events, and demonstrations disambiguated by context). The “part
of” relation ≤ over individuals / events / times / demonstrations (disambiguated
context) is set inclusion over℘+(IN) /℘+(EV) /℘+(TM) /℘+(DM): a ≤ b iff
a⊆ b. Finally, sum operation⊕ (disambiguated by context) is set union over℘+(IN)
/℘+(EV) /℘+(TM) /℘+(DM): a⊕b := a∪b.
As is common, events are connected to the domains of individuals and times
via θ -role and trace functions. θ -roles are partial functions from the domain of
individuals to the domain of events, that is, functions of type εe. The fact that we
have a special type for the domain of demonstrations means that we need θ -role
functions to take demonstrations to their participants, namely functions of type δe.
Because the domain of demonstrations is a subset of the domain of events, for each
role θ of type εe, I assume there is a role θ ′ of type δe that agrees with θ on all
demonstration events. More formally, I impose the requirement that for all xε , yδ ,
and θ , if xε = yδ , then θεe(xε) = θδe(yδ ).3 The only trace function I will be using is
the temporal trace function τ , which is a sum-homomorphism from events to times.
I assume that all theta-role functions are cumulatively closed by default, suppressing
the common ∗-notation.
While the inclusion of a special subset of demonstration events is a new idea, it
is not much of a conceptual leap. The last domain of entities we need in order to
analyze be like-quotation and ideophones is a domain of linguistic entities, which
more challenging. Essentially, we want to be able to say that the quoted words in a
verbatim be like-quotation and the the ideophone in an ideophone construction are
actually expressions that denote linguistic objects, objects that might themselves
have a denotation, syntactic category, phonological form, etc. In particular, I follow
Potts 2007 by including a domain (disjoint from all others) of linguistic entities of
3 Recall that equality is type agnostic, unlike all other object-language relations and functions.
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type µ . Potts 2007 takes linguistic entities to be triples, but for simplicity’s sake, I
treat linguistic objects as pairs—〈string, SEMANTIC REPRESENTATION〉. We can
think of this a reifying in the model the translation function mapping natural language
expressions (here strings) to their semantic representations. Thus, while the natural
language expression woman is translated to a lambda term denoting the particular
function in (5), the quoted natural language expression “woman” is translated as a
logical constant of type µ whose denotation is the pair of the unquoted string and
it’s denotation, as shown in (6). Note that I write expressions of type µ in sans serif.
(5) a. woman λxe[WOMAN(x)]
b. Jλxe[WOMAN(x)]Kg = the function F with domain De such that for all
d ∈ De, F(d) = JWOMAN(x)Kg[d/x]
(6) a. “woman” womanµ
b. JwomanµK= 〈woman,λxe[WOMAN(x)]〉
I use xbottom cornersy in the object language to access the semantic content of a
linguistic object via the meaning postulate in (7), which requires of all admissible
models that the interpretation of xMy, for any expression M of type µ , be the
interpretation of the second projection of the interpretation of M.
(7) For all expressions M of type µ and N of any type,JxMyK= JNK⇔ pi2(JMK) = N
The interpretation of xwomanµy in (8) illustrates how the biconditional in (7), is used
to extract the semantic representation of a linguistic object.
(8) JxwomanµyK= Jλxe[WOMAN(x)]K⇔
pi2(JwomanµK) = λxe[WOMAN(x)]⇔
pi2(〈woman,λxe[WOMAN(x)]〉) = λxe[WOMAN(x)]⇔
λxe[WOMAN(x)] = λxe[WOMAN(x)]
With this background, we can now treat quotational demonstration (a quotation
involving a linguistic expression) using an operator like (9), where DEMO is a
relation that holds between d and e just in case d reproduces aspects of e. The DEMO
relation, following Davidson 2015, is meant to capture the loose connection between
what is said in a be like-quotation and the demonstrated event. In a canonical case of
verbatim quotation like in (2) and (3), the demonstration event stands in the DEMO
relation with the quoted event in virtue of words used. In particular, the theme of
the demonstration event is precisely the linguistic object uttered in the demonstrated
event. But, as we have seen in examples like (4), a demonstration event might have
a linguistic object as a theme that does not play a direct role in the demonstrated
event. That said, such a demonstration event might still reproduce aspects of the
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Mary was like “I play guitar”
λe[AG(e) = M∧ THδ (d13) = I play guitar∧DEMO(d13,e)]
λxλe[AG(e) = x∧ THδ (d13) = I play guitar∧DEMO(d13,e)]
λdλe[THδ (d) = I play guitar∧DEMO(d,e)]
“I play guitar”
I play guitar
Q-DEMO
λuλdλe[THδ (d) = u∧DEMO(d,e)]
λVd〈εt〉λxλe[AG(e) = x∧V (d13)(e)]
like
d13
was
λdλVd〈εt〉λxλe[AG(e) = x∧V (d)(e)]
Mary
M
Figure 1 The composition of quotation
demonstrated event well enough to stand in the DEMO relation.
(9) Q-DEMO λuλdλe[THδ (d) = u∧DEMO(d,e)]
If (9) is at the heart of be like-quotation, it raises the question of how the demon-
stration argument is saturated. We need an expression to denote the ongoing act of
communication. Something similar is seen in performatives, like (10), where hereby
refers to the ongoing speech whose words both constitute and report the promise.
(10) I (hereby) promise to play guitar.
Following Eckardt 2012, which treats hereby in performative utterances as denoting
the contemporaneous event of information exchange, I take like in be like-quotation
to denote the ongoing demonstration event (diverging from Davidson (2015) who
treats the whole quoted expression as denoting a demonstration event).
(11) like dn (the ongoing act of information exchange in the utterance)
Finally, the “be” in be like-quotation, after composing with like, looks for a relation
between demonstrations and events, supplying its demonstration argument via the
indexical. This is what gives the construction is quotative character. In addition,
following Davidson 2015, it also introduces the external argument—namely the
agent of the event being demonstrated. Putting it together we can compositionally
derive the meaning of expressions like Mary was like “I play guitar” as follows:
After existential closure we have the translation of Mary was like “I play guitar”.
(12) ∃e[AG(e) = M∧ THδ (d13) = I play guitar∧DEMO(d13,e)]
Example (12) is true just in case in case there is an event e whose agent is Mary and
the current demonstration event whose theme is the linguistic entity “I play guitar”
reproduces aspects of e. As discussed above, the particular relationship between the
be like-quotation and what it quotes can be quite loose. In this case, because the
demonstration event, which must reproduce aspects of e, has the linguistic object
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I play guitar as its theme, a speaker might reasonably (defeasibly) infer that e is
a speaking event in which I play guitar is uttered. Though this inference must be
defeasible (see example (4)).
3 Ideophones in Tseltal
Recall from (1) that the basic ideophone construction in Tseltal has two core prop-
erties: (i) there is a bare (uninflected) root / stem, namely tsok’, and (ii) the root is
embedded under the reported speech predicate, namely chi. We consider each of
these in turn.
The fact that the ideophone in (1) is a bare stem raises the question of how
well-integrated ideophones are into the rest of the grammar. That is, are they merely
unanalyzable iconic strings, or are ideophone roots / stems on par with roots and
stems of other lexical categories? More concretely, is the ideophone « tsok’» in
Tseltal more like the verb sizzle in Engligh or the imitative string tsssss. I will
show that the former is the case. They not merely imitative sounds, but linguistic
objects in the fullest sense, namely strings with a (morpho)syntactic cateogry and
semantic representation. The fact that ideophone are bona fide linguistic objects
argues in favor of the position taken in this work that they deserve a compositional
semantic treatment, just like other expressions in the language. While the following
discussion requires a detailed discussion of Mayan morphology, the result has
important consequences for the theory of ideophones that this work develops. In
particular, I propose in this section that using an ideophone requires more than just
quoting an ideophone stem. Instead, I argue that the basic ideophone construction
includes an ideophone demonstration operator that syntactically selects for stems
of the appropriate category, while semantically requiring that those stems denote
an event-predicate. This position is harder to maintain if ideophones are merely
sound-symbolic strings, and so I must argue against this possibility.
To begin, it is important to note that Mayan languages make a categorical
distinction between roots of a particular category, which are always of the form
CVC, and derived stems of that category. For example, one often finds that CVC
roots of category X can occur in certain morphosyntactic configurations that derived
stems of category X cannot. I will show is that Tseltal ideophones are organized
along this root/stem paradigm exactly like other lexical categories in the language—
i.e., nouns, verbs, adjectives.
First, we find CVC ideophones—ideophone roots—that are specialized as such.
That is, they appear in the basic ideophone construction, but cannot be inflected as
if they were a root of another category. For instance, tsok’ in (1) is clearly a CVC
ideophone, but it cannot be used as if it were a root of another category, which I’ve
exemplified in (13) for the category transitive verb.
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(13) *ya
ICP
j-tsok’-Ø
A1-fried-B3
te
DET
chenek’=e.
bean=ENC
Sought: ‘I’m going to fry the beans.’ (Pérez González 2012: p. 162)
This fact establishes that there is a category “ideophone” because there CVC ideo-
phone roots that correspond to stems of no other category. We can now ask whether
the ideophone category is like other, more familiar categories like verbs.
Now note that Tseltal has explicitly derived ideophone stems. That is, just as
with more familiar lexical categories there are ways to form an ideophone stem
from a root of a category. For instance, there is a derivation -u / -i (phonologically
conditioned) that turns transitive verbs as well as positional roots like (14) into
indeophone stems.
(14) Chep-u
POS:filled.bag.thrown.down-IDF
x-chi-Ø
NT-say-B3
ta
P
j-jol.
A3-head
‘(Being hit will a filled bag), it went «chepu» on my head.’ (Pérez
González 2012: p. 166)
Crucially, you cannot use these roots in the basic ideophone construction without
first deriving them. For instance, (15) is ungrammatial. The root chep is just not an
ideophone root.
(15) *Chep
POS:filled.bag.thrown.down
x-chi-Ø
NT-say-B3
ta
P
j-jol.
A3-head
Reading sought: ‘(Being hit will a filled bag), it went «chep» on my head.’
What this shows is that Tseltal ideophones are not just atomic, unanalyzable expres-
sions, but belong to an abstract grammatical category into which other expressions
can be derived.
Second, as is common with other lexical categories, there are a non-trivial
number of roots that are polycategorial. Consider
√
jik’. Unlike
√
chep it can appear
underived in the basic ideophone construction, as in (16). But in constrast to other
root ideophones, like
√
tsok’ in (13), it can be inflected as a transitive verb without
derivation, as in (17).
(16) jik’
IDF:inhale/choke
x-chi-on=nax
NT-say-B2=just
ta
P
jik’ubajel
hiccup
jun-jun-ajk’
one-one-moment
‘You went jik’ by the hiccup repeatedly.’ (Pérez González 2012: p. 163)
(17) ya
ICP
j-jik’-Ø
A1-TV:inhale/choke-B3
j-mats’
A1-pozol
‘I choked on my pozol.’ (Pérez González 2012: p. 163)
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Polycategoricity, which is common in the root systems of Mayan languages, provides
a final argument that ideophone roots are like roots of any other category.
Summarizing, what we find is that (i) there is a distinct class of ideophone
stems that occur in the basic ideophone construction (some of which are CVC root
ideophones), (ii) there are ways of deriving ideophone stems from roots of other
categories, and (iii) some roots are belong simultaneously to the class of ideophone
stems as well as others (almost always a transitive verb). These morphosyntactic facts
provide evidence about the structure of the basic ideophone construction, but they
place strong constraints on the space of possible semantic accounts of ideophones.
Most importantly, the fact that one cannot use arbitrary roots in the basic ideo-
phone construction shows that ideophones cannot be reduced to quotation. The
reason is that practically anything can be quoted—e.g., “The monster was like
chakatubatz’a” or “The monster was like grrrrrr”. If ideophones were mere quo-
tations of an event, that is, the event made a sound that roughly corresponds to the
sound of the root in question, then why can’t one say (15), even though one can
quote the root as in (18)? The answer must be that chep is simply not an ideophone
stem and so cannot occur in the basic ideophone construction, which must be kept
separate from the quotation construction.
(18) “chep”
POS:filled.bag.thrown.down
x-chi-Ø
NT-say-B3
te
DET
alal=e.
baby=ENC
‘The baby said “chep”.’ (Jaime Pérez González, p.c.)
Given that making a demonstration by way of an ideophone is not mere quotation,
whatever differentiates ideophone demonstrations and quotational demonstrations is
part of the compositional semantics.
Second, the fact there are derived ideophone stems provides another argument
against an analysis of ideophones as mere quotation. I know of no language that
requires certain expressions to be morphologically marked in order to be quoted.
Instead, the existence of ideophones derived by -u / -i is more consistent with a
theory that posits an operator in the ideophone construction that selects stems of the
appropriate class.
I now provide an account of ideophones that not only captures their semantic
properties, but concords with these morphosyntactic facts. We have seen that, mor-
phologically, there is a close connection between ideophones and verbs. For this
reason, I will be treating ideophone stems, like verbal stems, to be neo-Davidsonian
predicates of events—e.g., λe[V (e)]. What this means is that the restricted distribu-
tion of ideophone roots must not be due to semantic considerations, but must instead
be a fact about morphosyntax, but this is exactly what the morphosyntanctic facts
above argue for.
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At the heart of the analysis an operator IDEO-DEMO. This operator selects for
ideophone stems in the syntax, and in the semantics returns an expression that can
be embedded under the verb chi’ “to say”, which heads the matrix VP in the basic
ideophone construction. In particular, it takes a linguistic expression (here always
an ideophone stem denoting a predicate of events) and derives a relation between
demonstrations and events.
(19) IDEO-DEMO λuλdλe[THδ (d) = u∧ STRUC-SIMxuy(d,e)]
In this way, IDEO-DEMO behaves exactly like the operator Q-DEMO in quotative
constructions that takes a linguistic object and derives a relation between a demon-
strations that involve that object and events, as shown in (20) (repeated from (9)).
(20) Q-DEMO λuλdλe[THδ (d) = u∧DEMO(d,e)]
Instead of a quotational demonstration, though, IDEO-DEMO operator requires the
event and demonstration must stand in the ideophone relation, which we saw must be
formally distinct due to the fact that quotation has a wider distribution. The present
account captures this difference in terms of whether the demonstration and event
argument have to stand in the DEMO relation or STRUC-SIMxuy relation. Recall that,
following Davidson 2015, the DEMO relation is meant to be radically underspecified,
which is meant to mirror the fact that one can use a be-like-quotation to demonstrate
a wide variety of events. In contrast, the use of ideophones to depict an event is much
more constrained. Not only can just a subset of verbs form ideophone stems, but the
events depicted by means of the ideophone must satisfy the relevant aspects of its
lexical content. For instance, using jik’ as an ideophone means depicting events with
an inhaling sound, and only those events. With this in mind, we can begin unpack
STRUC-SIMxuy . I say begin because the next section on demonstration-external
pluractionality fleshes out the account to more faithfully address the meaning of
pluractional ideophones.
The core idea underlying the STRUC-SIMxuy relation is that the utterance of
an ideophone as a linguistic object is meant to stand for an event that satisfies the
predicate that the ideophone stem denotes. That is, the demonstration event is meant
to be structurally similar to the demonstrated event, where “structurally similar” at
this first pass means just similar cardinality. Example (21) provides the meaning of
STRUC-SIMxuy .
4
(21) STRUC-SIMxuy(d,e) iff there is a set P meeting the following conditions:
4 The following defines partitions for sum-individuals and a useful abbreviation to refer to the atomic
parts of a sum-individual, as used in (21): namely, partition(P,x) iff
⊕
P= x & ∀x(x ∈ P→¬∃y(y∈
P∧O(x,y))), and atoms(x) := {x′|x′ ≤ x∧ATOM(x′)}
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tsok’ xchi ta mantekat
λe[AG(e) = x1∧ THδ (d13) = tsok’∧ STRUC-SIMxtsok’y(d13,e)∧ LOC(e) = σx.∗ LARD(x)]
ta mantekat
λVεtλe[V (e)∧ LOC(e) = σx.∗ LARD(x)]λe[AG(e) = x1∧ THδ (d13) = tsok’∧ STRUC-SIMxtsok’y(d13,e)]
λxλe[AG(e) = x∧ THδ (d13) = tsok’∧ STRUC-SIMxtsok’y(d13,e)]
λdλe[THδ (d) = tsok’∧ STRUC-SIMxtsok’y(d,e)]
“tsok’”
tsok’
IDEO-DEMO
λuλdλe[THδ (d) = u∧ STRUC-SIMxuy(d,e)]
λVd〈εt〉λxλe[AG(e) = x∧V (d13)(e)]
pro
d13
xchi’
λdλVd〈εt〉λxλe[AG(e) = x∧V (e)]
pro
x1
Figure 2 The composition of ideophones
a. partition(P,e)
b. ∀e′ ∈ P[xuy(e′)]
c. ∃e′ ≤ e[ATOM(e′)∧ xuy(e′)]→∀e′ ∈ P[ATOM(e′)] to be amended in
(27)
d. |atoms(d)|= |P|
After existential closure of the event argument, we get the following translation.
(22) ∃e[AG(e) = x1∧ THδ (d13) = tsok’∧ STRUC-SIMxtsok’y(d13,e)∧LOC(e) = σx.LARD(x)]
This is be true just in case: (i) there is an event e that takes place in the lard whose
participant is x1 (the particular individual will be given by the context / variable
assignment), (ii) the current demonstration event d13 has as its theme the linguistic
object tsok’, and (iii) this demonstration event is structurally similar to e. Here
structural similarity is easily satisfied. Because d13 is atomic, e must be partitionable
into a single event (the trivial partition) that satisfied by xtsok’y = λe[TSOK’(e)],
namely e must be an event of frying sound emission. Less formally, (22) requires that
there be an event of trying sound emission that took place in the lard that is presented
via the utterance of word “tsok’”. These are precisely the truth-conditions of (1).
4 Demonstration-external pluractionality in Tseltal
With a demonstration-based account of ideophones in hand, we have a handle on how
it is that ideophones seem to depict events instead of describing them. Essentially,
using an ideophone means using the utterance of that ideophone to stand for an event
that would other satisfy the ideophone (as an event predicate). This immediately
predicts that we should be able to utter such a linguistic object more than once, and
in doing do, demonstrate a plurality of events. This section is devoted to preceisely
this phenomenon, which I call “demonstration-external pluractionality”.
As shown in the following example from Tseltal, one can totally reduplicate an
674
Demonstrations and ideophones
ideophone to demonstrate a plurality of events.
(23) ja’-Ø
FOC-B3
te
SUB
kan-kon-Ø,
IDF:sound.wood/drum-C1on-B3
kan
IDF
[pause]
[pause]
kan
IDF
[pause]
[pause]
kan
IDF
x-chi-Ø=e
NT-say-B3=ENC
‘When it knocks, it goes knock knock knock.’ (Pérez González 2012: p.
242)
While we will see that such pluractional demonstrations are quite complex, the basic
facts follow immediately under the account of ideophones I have proposed. I propose
that when a speaker says "kan kan kan xchi" she makes a plural demonstration
d4 with the usual part-whole structure, where each atomic demonstration in d4 has
as its theme the ideophone in question. That is, d4 = d1⊕d2⊕d3 and THδ (d1) =
kan, THδ (d2) = kan, etc.
An ideophone demonstration like this would yield the following predicate of
events after composing with the Q-DEMO operator and having its demonstration
argument saturated indexically. Note that because theta roles are cumulatively
closed, d4 stands in the theme relation with the linguistic object kan in virtue of its
atomic parts standing in that relation.
(24) λe[THδ (d4) = kan∧ STRUC-SIMxkany(d4,e)]
An event e satisfies (24) just in case the theme of d4 is the linguistic object kan and
STRUC-SIMxkany(d4,e) holds between d4 and e. The latter condition is satisfied just
in case e can be partitioned into as many xkany = λe[KAN(e)] events—i.e., knocking
events—as there are atoms in d4. That is, the pluractional demonstration in (23)
faithfully demonstrates an event just in case it is an event of three knockings.
These are not exactly the truth conditions of (24), but they provide a lower bound
until we update the meaning of STRUC-SIMxny(d,e) in (27). More importantly,
though, they illustrate how the view of ideophones developed here naturally extends
to cases of pluractionality via reduplication. If in an ideophone demonstration the
utterance of the ideophone as a linguistic object is meant to stand for an event that
satisfies the predicate that linguistic object denotes, then uttering multiple instances
of that ideophone in a single demonstration should demonstration pluractional
events. I now want to refine the meaning of STRUC-SIMxny(d,e) to account for
other properties of demonstration-external pluractionality.
First, it is not true that demonstrating an event by uttering an ideophone three
times requires that event to be of cardinality three. Instead, the cardinality must be
at least three. The third condition in (25) shows the relevant change, namely e is
structurally similar to d if there is partition of e that has no fewer cells than d has
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atomic parts.
(25) STRUC-SIMxuy(d,e) iff there is a set P meeting the following conditions:
a. PARTITION(P,e)
b. ∀e′ ∈ P[xuy(e′)]
c. |atoms(d)| ≤ |P|
The second property of demonstration-external pluractionality that we must account
for is much more interesting, requiring greater changes to the notion of structural
similarity. In particular, the manner of reduplication in a demonstration-external
pluractional utterance iconically reproduces the temporal properties of the event-
plurality. This can be shown via the assertion of the (rough) equivalance between
kinds of reduplicated ideophones, and kinds of bona fide derived pluractional verbs,
which must be event predicates. In examples (23) above and (26), speakers use
ideophone demonstrations to provide the truth condition for verbal pluractional
constructions that, crucially, involve the same root.
(26) ja’-Ø
FOC-B3
x-chak’-lajan-Ø
NT-IDF:sound.horse.hoofs-lajan-B3
te
DET
bay
where
chak’chak’chak
IDF||IDF||IDF
x-chi-Ø=e
NT-say-B3=ENC
‘It’s the sound of trotting horses when it goes «chak’»«chak’»«chak»
The point is that « idf»« idf»« idf» demonstrates events with a different temporal
character than « idf» « idf» « idf». In particular, « idf»« idf»« idf» demonstrates
events that can fall in the extension of a pluractional predicate derived by -C1on,
while « idf» « idf» « idf» demostrates events that can fall in the extension of a
pluractional predicate derived by -lajan. These facts show that for a demonstration
event to be structurally similar to a second event, the demonstration event must not
only have a similar cardinality, but a similar temporal profile.
While the definition of structural similarity must be extended to account for
this behavior, the close connection between verbal pluractional constructions and
pluractional ideophones is predicted under a demonstration-based account of ideo-
phones. Demonstrations, which mediate the iconic link between the ideophone and
the depicted event, are merely events themselves. As such, the have temporal struc-
ture. Moreover, in this theory, a demonstration via an ideophone root is supposed to
“stand for” an event satisfying the event-predicate underlying the ideophone. The
temporality of the ideophone construction is built in, and so it follows that one could
make a plurality of demonstrations to depict a plurality of events, and the temporal
structure of the plurality of demonstrations, which it inherently has, would then have
to match the temporal structure of the depicted event plurality. All that we have to
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do to account for the observed behavior is to make the demonstrated event sensitive
to the inherent temporal structure of the demonstration event. I do this by adding
a temporal similarilty condition—TEMP-SIM—to the meaning of STRUC-SIM as
follows, which is the final definition.
(27) STRUC-SIMxuy(d,e) iff there is a set P meeting the following conditions:
a. PARTITION(P,e)
b. ∀e′ ∈ P[xuy(e′)]
c. |atoms(d)| ≤ |P|
d. TEMP-SIM(P,atoms(d))
Because the demonstration is allowed to be of a smaller cardinality than the partition,
we cannot define temporal similarity by requiring some isomorphism between P
and atoms(d). Instead, temporal similarity will be enfored by requiring structure-
preserving mappings to hold between the atomic parts of the demonstration event and
initial phases of the event demonstrated. Example (28) provides the first ingredient,
which is the definition of “initial subset”. In particular, P′ is an initial subset of P
just in case it subset of P and there is no event in P and not in P′ that precedes any
event in P′.
(28) P′ ⊆init P iff
a. P′ ⊆ P
b. ∀e[e ∈ P′→¬∃e′[e′ ∈ P\P′∧ τ(e′)≺ τ(e)]]
We can now define temporal similary as follows, where P is temporally similar to
D just in case for every initial subset P′ of the same cardinality of D, there is a
one-to-one function mapping temporally adjacent events in D to events in P′ that
have the same amount of downtime between them.5
(29) TEMP-SIM(P,D) iff for all P′ ⊆τ P such that |P′|= |D|, there is an injection
f : D→ P′ satisfying:
a. ∀d,d′ ∈ D[ADJACENTD(d,d′)→
downtime(d,d′) = downtime( f (d), f (d′))
The TEMP-SIM condition is used to require that plural demonstrations can only
be used to demonstrate events whose initial segments can be chopped into parts
where adjacent events have similar downtimes to adjacent atomic demonstrations.
5 The definition of the predicate ADJACENT and the function downtime are provided here, namely:
ADJACENTX (e,e′) iff ¬O(e,e′) & ¬∃e′′ ∈ X [τ(e) ≺ τ(e′′) ≺ τ(e′)∨ τ(e′) ≺ τ(e′′) ≺ τ(e)], while
downtime(e,e′) := /0 if O(τ(e),τ(e′)), else
⊕{t ∈ Dτ |τ(e)≺ t ≺ τ(e′)∨ τ(e′)≺ t ≺ τ(e)} (or ‘the
contiguous temporal interval between e and e′’).
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Essentially, TEMP-SIM(P,D) requires that when we look at the beginning of P, we
see a copy of D in terms of temporal structure. Note that TEMP-SIM(P,D) has some
properties we want for dealing with ideophones. First, as mentioned above, the
condition allows P to be of greater cardinality than D, which is necessary when
a smaller number of demonstrations is used to demonstrate a larger number of
events. Second, the condition is vacuously satisfied if D is of cardinality 1. This
is required for when an atomic demonstration demonstrates an atomic event. We
still want to say in that case that they (trivially) have a similar temporal structure.
Finally, the resulting truth conditions are appropriately weak. In particular, just
as the number of ideophone demonstrations sets a lower bound for the number of
events demonstrated, the temporal structure of those demonstrations sets a lower
bound for temporal structure of the events demonstrated. When a speaker depicts an
event e using « idf»[pause]« idf»[pause]« idf», the listener knows, as an entailment,
that the initial subsequence of e must have the structure e′[pause]e′′[pause]e′′′. She
then reasons (defeasibly) that if these three events do not exhaust e, then subsequent
events in e are similarly structured in time.
5 Demonstration-internal pluractionality in Upper Necaxa Totonac
In this section I will show that languages with rich ideophone systems can have
other types of pluractional ideophone constructions. In particular, I am interested
in cases where there is dedicated derivational morphology that creates ideophones
stems that can only depict plural events. That is, an atomic demonstration using
one of these derived ideophones will still necessarily depict a plural event. I will
call this kind of pluractionality—where a single demonstration depicts a plural
event—demonstration-internal pluractionality. As we will see, demonstration-
internal pluractionality lies in-between demonstration-external pluractionality like
that discussed in the previous section and bona fide verbal pluractionality. In
particular, the relevant ideophone stems will be like pluractional verbs, denoting
plural events. What separates them from pluractional verbs is that, as ideophones,
they can be used in the course of a demonstration in the basic ideophone construction,
but in virtue of their pluractional semantics, will always demonstrate plural events.
First, note that UNT has what looks like demonstration-external pluractionality
in Tseltal where total reduplication indicates the repetition of an event that could be
demonstrated by a single utternace of the ideophone.
(30) Upper Necaxa Totonac
a. te
˜
:ì
IDF:sound.hit.ground
ik-ta-wi:ì
1SG.SUBJ-INCH-sit
ka:-s’ewi´
˜
wi
˜PLC-cool
a
˜
ntsa´
here
‘Te
˜
:ì I plopped myself down here where it’s cool.’ (Beck 2008: 15a)
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b. mat
QTV
te
˜
:ì-te
˜
:ì
IDF:sound.hit.ground-RED
li:ta:ti:ta´:
bounce.on.bottom
tsama´:
this
mis´in
jaguar
‘the jaguar bounced around on its rear end’ (Beck 2008: 15b)
In addition to this, though, UNT has a second way to form ideophones that de-
pict pluractional events, namely through final -(V)CV reduplication (hereafter -CV
reduplication).
(31) tsanana
IDF:sound.buzzing
kin-a
˜
’a-wán
1OBJ-eat-say
taSka´t
wild.bee
‘The bee went tsanana in my ear.’ (Beck 2008: ex. 18b)
Example (32) presents a few pairs of ideophone that illustrate a semantic difference
between -CV reduplicated ideophones and their plain or completely reduplicated
counterparts. In all cases we have pluractional semantics, but -CV reduplicated
ideophones appear to depict events whose repetitions comes more rapidly are are
“minimized” relative to their non-CV-reduplicated counterparts.
(32) a. lam ‘fire flaring up’
lamama ‘coals glowing red’
b. ku
˜
Sku
˜
S ‘kocking on something’
ku
˜
Su
˜
Su
˜
‘tapping quickly on something’ (Beck 2008: p. 14)
While interesting from the perspective of the the theory of pluractionality, the
exact semantic contribution of -CV reduplication is not our focus. Instead, the facts
in (32) raise the question of whether -CV reduplication and total reduplication in
the ideophone domain have a unified account. The previous section defended the
proposal that total reduplication in Tseltal, demonstration-external pluractionality,
was essentially iconic. Each utterance of the ideophone stem was meant to stand for
an event that would satisfy the event predicate denoted by the stem. At first pass, then,
we might analyze -CV reduplication in Upper Necaxa Totonac as essentially iconic in
the same way. Each -CV reduplicant would correspond to its own demonstration of
an event satisfying the event predicate the ideophone stem denotes. Additionally, we
might say that the reason why CV-reduplicated ideophones in Upper Necaxa Totonac
depict events with rapid repetitions and “minimized” events is also an iconic effect. In
particular, in virtue of being affixal, these -CV reduplicants are necessarily temporally
adjacent and “smaller” than the root itself. I think we can reject this kind of analysis,
though. The data instead support treating CV-derived ideophones as a unique kind
of pluractionality in the ideophone domain, separate from demonstration-external
pluractionality. In particular, we will see that -CV reduplication in Upper Necaxa
Totonac has undergone significant grammaticalization, which argues for treating
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its pluractional effect in the descriptive semantics rather than through the iconic,
demonstration-based component.
The primary problem for a purely iconic account of partial reduplication is that
the semantic effect of -CV reduplication in Upper Necaxa Totonac ideophones is
clearly conventionalized in ways that it is not in Tseltal. In Tseltal, one can always
predict the meaning of a reduplicated ideophone from the meaning of the ideophone
root. Totaly reduplication always means depicting a plurality of events of the kind
a non-reduplicated ideophone would depict. In Upper Necaxa Totonac, though,
one finds a large numbers of CV-reduplicated ideophones that seem to have no
transparent semantic relationship to ideophones that share the same root. As (Beck
2008: p. 14) notes, the two forms appear to be unique lexemes in that one could not
predict the meaning of one reduplicated ideophone from the meaning of the other.
(33) a. pampam ‘large bird flying’
b. pamama ‘smoke billowing from a building’ (Beck 2011: p. 471)
(34) a. Sa
˜
xSa
˜
x ‘dirt, sand, or dust striking a surface’
b. Sa
˜
xa
˜
xa
˜
‘heavy rain falling’ (Beck 2011: p. 692)
(35) a. xilixili ‘horse galloping and rearing’
b. xilili ‘roaring (plane, rushing water, thunder)’ (Beck 2008: ex. 20b)
These facts rule out a purely iconic account. We don’t want to say that there is an
ideophone root pam that can be reduplicated in two ways—as in (33-a) and (33-b)—
to depict event-pluralities in its extension with two different temporal profiles.
The reason is that (33-a) and (33-b) depict plural events of completely different
characters. Instead, I propose to treat -CV reduplication as derivational, which has
a partially uniform semantic effect (i.e., pluractionality), but is also sometimes
idiosyncratic, as the semantic effect of derivation often is. The idea is that just
like one finds an overt instantiation of a morpheme that derives ideophone stems in
Tseltal (e.g., derived ideophones like in (14) above), Upper Necaxa Totonac would
have an ideophone derivation whose phonological reflex is -CV reduplication. While
similar to the Tseltal derivation -i / -u, the proposal is that the -CV derivation in
Upper Necaxa Totonac would also have pluractional semantics. That is, instead of
returning a simple event predicate that can be used in an ideophone demonstration (as
we see in Tseltal), the -CV derivation derives an ideophone stem that is a predicate
of plural events. Example (36) gives a preliminary translation emphasizing the
pluractional effect of derivation by -CV reduplication.
(36) CVvid  λVεtλe[∗V (e)∧¬ATOM(e)] (preliminary)
While (36) is not a fully fleshed out account of the pluractional, it captures the
two core features of the derivation that that interest us here. First, in virtue of its
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syntactic category, CVvid derives ideophone stems—expressions restricted to occur
in the basic ideophone construction(s) of Upper Necaxa Totonac. Second, in the
semantics, CVvid derives predicates of plural events. This will have the crucial effect
on the behavior of CV-derived ideophone stems that leads to demonstration-internal
pluractionality when used in a demonstration. In particular, a speaker will only be
able to demonstrate plural events with CV-derived ideophones, even an in atomic
demonstration. We can see how this works by considering an example.
(37) xalalala
IDF:sound.hot.stone.crackle
maka-wan
hand-say
tSiwi´S
stone
‘The stones went xalalala (crackling with heat).’ (Beck 2008: ex. 18a)
(38) ∃e[AG(e)=σx.∗STONE(x)∧THδ (d13)= xalalala∧STRUC-SIMxxalalalay(d13,e)]
The resulting bottom-line truth conditions for (37) are given in (38). This formula
is true just in case there is an event e whose agent is the stones such that d13 is a
demonstration via xalalala and d13 is structurally similar to e. The latter condition
is the crucial one. Given that d13 is an atomic demonstration, the condition is
satisfied just in case e can be partitioned (trivially) into a single event that satisfies
xxalalalay = λe[∗XALA(e)∧¬ATOM(e)]. But given that this is a predicate of plural
events, e must be a pluractional event. The result is that even when the speaker
makes a single demonstration by uttering xalalala she will be demonstrating an event
of plural character. This is different from what we saw in Tseltal where the same
ideophone stem was uttered multiple times to demonstrate a pluractional event and
once to demonstrate an event of singular character. It is precisely this contrast that
distinguishes demonstration-internal and demonstration-external pluractionality.
6 Conclusion
The core goal of this project is to motivate a compositional semantics of ideophones
that respects their iconic character while relating their meaning to more familiar,
non-iconic semantic phenomena. In line with the first goal, I have shown that the core
properties of ideophones can be treated in a demonstration-based framework first
developed to account for be like-quotation and iconic phenomena in sign languages
(Davidson 2015). In line with the second goal, I have shown that this semantics
allows us to diagnose two kinds of ideophonic pluractionality, and whose account
closely tracks previous work on pluractionality. That is, pluractionality involves
plural event reference and ideophone pluractionality involves both plural demonstra-
tions (which are themselves simply plural events) and derived ideophones that make
direct reference to plural events.
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